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Recent Cases
The United States
Supreme Court Holds
That Consumer Debtors
May Reorganize Under
Chapter 11
In Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.Ct.
2197 (1991), the United States
Supreme Court held that a con-
sumer debtor not engaged in an
ongoing business falls within Sec-
tion 109 of the Bankruptcy Code
and is therefore eligible for reorga-
nization under Chapter 11, 11
U.S.C. 1101 et seq. Although
Chapter 11 was intended to be
used primarily by business debtors,
the Court did not impose an ongo-
ing business requirement because
it found no underlying policy con-
sideration or congressional intent
for such a requirement, and the
plain language of the Bankruptcy
Code permitted individual debtors
to file under Chapter 11.
Background
Sheldon Baruch Toibb
("Toibb") worked as a consultant
to the Independence Electric Cor-
poration ("IEC") from March,
1983 until April, 1985. After being
terminated from IEC, Toibb failed
to find employment as a consultant
in the energy field. On November
18, 1986, Toibb filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
701 et seq. in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
Toibb had no secured debts but
had unsecured debts and a disput-
ed federal tax priority claim. His
nonexempt assets included 24 per-
cent of IEC's shares and a possible
claim against his former IEC busi-
ness associates. When Toibb
learned that his IEC shares were
worth $25,000 to the company's
board of directors, he decided to
avoid liquidation under Chapter 7
by bringing his case under the
reorganization provision of Chap-
ter 11.
Toibb's plan for reorganization
included paying his unsecured
creditors approximately 11 cents
on the dollar plus, for six years,
paying 50 percent of either IEC
dividends or proceeds from the
sale of IEC stock, up to the full
amount of the debt. The Bankrupt-
cy Court dismissed Toibb's peti-
tion on the grounds that he was not
engaged in an ongoing business
and therefore not entitled to Chap-
ter 11 protection.
The decision was affirmed on
appeal to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri. Both lower courts relied
on a prior decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that
Chapter 11 relief was unavailable
to persons not engaged in business.
The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed. The Eighth Circuit found
that the Bankruptcy Court had the
authority to dismiss the petition on
its own motion. In addition, the
Eighth Circuit found its prior deci-
sion controlling. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of a conflict between the
circuits as to whether a nonbusi-
ness debtor may reorganize under
Chapter 11.
The Code's Plain Language is
Dispositive
The Supreme Court found that
the plain language of the Bankrupt-
cy Code answered the question of
whether reorganization under
Chapter 11 was available to Toibb.
In Section 109 of the Code, Con-
gress specifically stated, "Only a
person that may be a debtor under
Chapter 7 of this title, except a
stockbroker or a commodity bro-
ker, and a railroad may be a debtor
under Chapter 11 of this title." 11
U.S.C. 109. Congress specifically
excluded stockbrokers, commodity
brokers, and railroads but not non-
business individual debtors.
The Court then looked to Sec-
tion 109(b) to determine whether
Toibb was a debtor under Chapter
7. "A person may be a debtor
under Chapter 7 of this title only if
such person is not 1) a railroad, 2) a
domestic insurance company,
bank,.., or 3) a foreign insurance
company, bank, . . . engaged in
such business in the United
States." Therefore, Toibb qualified
as a debtor under Chapter 11 be-
cause he met the statutory require-
ment of Chapter 7, and Chapter 11
does not specifically exclude indi-
vidual debtors who lack ongoing
businesses.
Congress Did Not Intend to
Exclude Consumer Debtors
In determining Congress's in-
tent, the Supreme Court examined
the statutory language first. Since
the language of Section 109 was
clear, there was no reason to con-
sider the legislative history of the
statute. Although the Court be-
lieved there was an understanding
that Chapter 11 would be used
primarily by business debtors, it
found legislative history and intent
did not clearly indicate individual
consumer debtors were excluded
from reorganization under Chap-
ter 11. Accordingly, the Court dis-
posed of the argument posed in the
amicus curiae brief that the legisla-
tive history supported the theory
that Chapter 11 was intended only
for business debtors.
The Court, instead, agreed with
Toibb's argument that Congress,
acting through Chapter 11, did not
have the single goal of protecting
business debtors; Congress also
sought to maximize the value of
bankruptcy estates. Chapter 11
protects an estate's value because a
debtor's reorganization plan would
not be confirmed unless either all
creditors accepted the debtor's
plan or all creditors are guaranteed
to receive at least the same amount
they would receive under Chapter
7 liquidation. Therefore, there can
be no contention that creditors
would be in a worse position if the
debtor reorganized under Chapter
11 rather than liquidated under
Chapter 7. Absent a showing of
harm to the creditors, the Court
found nothing in Chapter 11 to
support the inference that Con-
gress intended to exclude consum-
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er debtors from Chapter 11 cover-
age.
The Court disagreed with the
lower court's opinion that allowing
consumer debtors to proceed un-
der Chapter 11 would flood the
bankruptcy courts with reorganiza-
tion plans. First, the cost and com-
plexity of filing under Chapter 11
acts as a deterrent. Second, bank-
ruptcy courts have the discretion
to dismiss Chapter 11 cases if
debtors do not have workable reor-
ganization plans.
The Court also refused to adopt
the argument that extending Chap-
ter 11 to consumer debtors would
run contrary to Congress's intent
to prevent involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings under Chapter 13.
Congress's concern regarding
Chapter 13 was that forcing a
debtor, whose future wages were
not exempt from the bankruptcy
estate, into bankruptcy proceed-
ings would violate the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection against
involuntary servitude. However,
because Chapter 11 has no provi-
sion requiring a debtor to pay
future wages to a creditor, the
Court found the involuntary servi-
tude concern irrelevant to Chapter
11 proceedings.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent stated
that a complete reading of the
statute revealed no congressional
intent to allow individual consum-
er debtors to reorganize under
Chapter 11. The dissent relied on
repeated references to business in
both Chapter 11 language and the
legislative history and also the dif-
ference between the chapter titles
(Chapter 11 entitled "Reorganiza-
tion" contrasted with Chapter 13
entitled "Adjustment of Debts of
an Individual with Regular In-
come").
Further, the dissent noted that
just because the statute states only
a person eligible as a debtor under
Chapter 7 may be a debtor under
Chapter 11, it cannot be inferred
that every person eligible under
Chapter 7 is eligible under Chapter
11.
Finally, the dissent stated that
individual consumer debtors could
be forced into bankruptcy by credi-
tors, since involuntary proceedings
could be instituted under Chapters
7 and 11. If an individual consum-
er debtor filed under Chapter 11,
as allowed by the majority opinion,
a creditor could begin involuntary
proceedings against the debtor.
The dissent found such proceed-
ings inconsistent with Congress's
protection of the same class of
creditors under Chapter 13.
Stacy Feldman
The United States
Supreme Court
Enforces A
Non-Negotiated Forum
Selection Clause On A
Cruise Ship Ticket
In Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court held
that a non-negotiated forum selec-
tion clause, located on the back of a
cruise ticket, was enforceable. The
Court also held that this clause did
not take away the passengers' right
to a trial by a court of competent
jurisdiction as required by The
Limitation of Vessel Owners Lia-
bility Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 183c.
Background
Mr. and Mrs. Shute ("Shutes")
were residents of Washington
state. They purchased tickets for a
cruise on a ship owned by petition-
ers, Carnival Cruise Lines ("Carni-
val"), headquartered in Miami,
Florida. The reverse side of the
tickets contained a forum selection
clause typed in fine print. This
clause provided that all disputes
with Carnival were to be litigated
in a Florida court. Additionally, it
stated that by accepting the ticket,
the purchaser was deemed to have
agreed to all of its terms and
conditions.
While on the cruise, Mrs. Shute
was injured when she slipped on a
deck mat. This accident occurred
when the ship was located in inter-
national waters off the coast of
Mexico. The Shutes filed suit
against Carnival in the United
States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington, alleg-
ing that Mrs. Shute's injuries were
the result of negligence on the part
of Carnival and its employees.
Carnival responded by contend-
ing that the forum selection clause
on the Shutes' tickets dictated that
the suit should have been filed in a
Florida court. Alternatively, Car-
nival asserted that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the cruise line because its
contacts with the State of Washing-
ton were insubstantial. The district
court granted Carnival's summary
judgment motion, holding that the
cruise line's contacts with Wash-
ington were constitutionally insuf-
ficient to support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling for two reasons.
First, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the cruise line's solici-
tation of business in Washington
was sufficient contact to justify the
district court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Second, the court, re-
lying on The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
("The Bremen"), agreed with the
Shutes' argument that the forum
selection clause was unenforceable
because it was not freely bargained
for. Additionally, the Ninth Cir-
cuit refused to enforce the clause
based on evidence that the Shutes
were physically and financially in-
capable of pursuing the litigation
in Florida. Thus, the enforcement
of the clause would deprive them
of their day in court and contra-
vene the Supreme Court's holding
in The Bremen.
Carnival appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court examined
the Ninth Circuit's analysis of The
Bremen, since both parties relied
on that case as support for their
arguments.
In The Bremen, the Supreme
Court addressed the enforceability
of a forum selection clause in a
contract between two business cor-
porations. The case discussed a
number of factors that made en-
forcement of such a clause reason-
(continued on page 30)
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991 29
